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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY

PAUL HARIDAKIS*

INTRODUCTION
Like July 4, 1776, and June 7, 1941, September 11, 2001 is indelibly
imprinted on the minds of most United States citizens, and has had profound
effects on the operation of our Government. In the aftermath of the
devastating September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World
Trade Center, the executive branch was reorganized with the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security and significant government initiatives (e.g.,
the USA PATRIOT Act, the authorization of military tribunals, closing
deportation proceedings, classifying previously public information, expanding
executive privilege and control of presidential records) to enhance the
government’s capacity to wage a war on terrorism were implemented. 1
Many of these initiatives permit the executive branch to withhold
information from the press and public at its discretion. 2 These initiatives have
generated tremendous debate as some officials support the proposals as added
protections for the United States and its citizens while others expressed

* Paul Haridakis (J.D., Ph.D) is an associate professor in the School of Communication Studies at
Kent State University.
1. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat, 2135 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001); Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy to Immigration Judges
and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/aclu/
creppy092101memo.pdf (directing immigration judges to close hearings to the public in certain
cases in which the Attorney General has implemented additional security procedures); Emanuel
Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of
September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2002); Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable But
Insufficient—Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 1145 (2002).
2. For a discussion of the Bush Administration’s efforts to curtail discretionary disclosures,
see James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” verses “Access to Evil:” Should Disclosure Laws
Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 568-69
(2003).
3
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concern that they give the government too much latitude to engage in
clandestine activities without the public’s knowledge. 3
This is no simple dilemma to resolve. There is always a need, particularly
during times of war, to protect the republic, the collective rights of citizens,
and homeland security. But, of course, the obligation to protect individual
rights always remains. In the current atmosphere in which the United States is
fighting a war in Iraq, and simultaneously an ongoing war against terrorism,
we find ourselves in a period of perceived crisis. In light of efforts taken by
the government in the 21st century to control and withhold information from
the public about the war on terrorism, the tension between the public’s desire
to obtain government-controlled information and the government’s desire to
withhold it is particularly salient.
The tension between these competing interests is not a recent phenomenon.
The right of “the people” to receive information has been referenced by
political leaders and scholars since the founding of the United States. 4
However, the Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance regarding
the extent to which the First Amendment protects a public right of access
mandating government openness.
However, one thing is certain: finding the proper balance between
protecting homeland security and maintaining the integrity and accountability
of government bodies comes down to resolving the extent of the public’s right
to access information necessary to make judgments about government activity.
This paper focuses on the extent of the public’s First Amendment right to
access information, including information pertaining to actions taken by the
government in the War on Terrorism. However, a comprehensive review of all

3. For recent reviews and commentary on various such initiatives, see Patrice McDermott,
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671
(2003); James T. O’Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus Between Public Access
and Terrorist Attack, 64 LA. L. REV. 809 (2004); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The
Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005); Susan
Dente Ross, Secrecy’s Assault on the Constitutional Right to Open Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 351
(2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die
Behind Closed Doors:” The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 132 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 641 (2003); Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools
of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 451 (2004); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound
Legal Basis?:” The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605
(2003); Bradley Pack, Note, FOIA Frustration: Access to Government Records Under the Bush
Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2004); Darren W. Stanhouse, Comment, Ambition and
Abdication: Congress, The Presidency, and the Evolution of the Department of Homeland
Security, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 691 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the
Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 144-49 (2003) (discussing the development
of “right to know” jurisprudence).
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of the ways the PATRIOT Act and other government initiatives may affect
citizen access to information cannot be addressed comprehensively in a single
paper. Similarly, comprehensive coverage of all case law and commentary
throughout the years pertaining to the public’s First Amendment right of access
to government information and practices also cannot be addressed adequately
in a single paper. Accordingly, the discussion must be both representative and
illustrative.
This essay will be organized in four parts. First, I will review
representative literature and case law pertaining to the extent of the First
Amendment right of access to information. Second, I will briefly discuss the
Freedom of Information Act, the principle piece of federal legislation
pertaining to public access to government records. Third, I will review
representative examples of government action during the War on Terrorism
that has constrained public access to information held by the government.
Finally, I will attempt to place recent executive branch actions, which have
been cloaked in secrecy, in historical context.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The importance of public access to information and visibility of
government processes cannot be overstated. The right of citizens to receive
information about government activities is a notion that predates the United
States Constitution. 5
Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of
Independence that governments derive their authority from the consent of the
governed. 6 Jefferson’s concept of self-governance formed the foundation upon
which our Federal Constitution is based. 7
Given these central tenets of United States democratic principles (i.e., that
it is a republic based on public consent and the right of “the people” to dictate
the itinerary of their government), various jurists have advanced the idea that
the right of access to information should be fostered and protected by the First
Amendment. 8 Put succinctly, the citizens, not the government, should decide
what information is needed to participate in self-governance. 9

5. See William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and His Contemporaries, 9 J.L. & POL’Y
595, 607-08 (1993).
6. Id.
7. See Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the Declaration of
Independence?, 1 NEV. L.J. 138, 144 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan J.,
concurring) (arguing that the public right to receive information is so fundamental that the
government is limited in its authority to interfere with it).
9. Id.
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Although self-governance does not mean that the people rule in a practical
sense, “they do judge those who do.” 10 Thus, it has been argued that “[t]he
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit . . . governmental
suppression of embarrassing information” and that “[s]ecrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic.” 11
The view that access to information is the foundation upon which other
freedoms rest has significant historical support. 12 For example, when
criticizing the Sedition Act of 1798, enacted at the end of the 18th century, one
of our founders, James Madison, referred to the freedom to “examine public
characters and measures, and of free communication thereon” as “the only
effectual guardian of every other right.” 13 In the 19th century, legal
philosopher Jeremy Bentham added that “in comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account.” 14 Similarly, in the late 20th century former
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan claimed that the exercise of public
debate and other civic behavior rests on the “antecedent assumption” that it
“must be informed.” 15 When specifically considering the intent of our
founders, legal historian Harold Cross argued that “the struggle for freedom of
speech and of the press bars any notion that the men of 1791 intended to
provide for freedom to disseminate such information but to deny freedom to
acquire it.” 16
On the other hand, there is historical evidence that the extent of the right to
access information is not as robust as such esteemed advocates suggested.
Apparently, at least some of our founders were not greatly concerned with the
right of access. Evidence of the lack of concern for the free flow of
information includes the secret proceedings at the Constitutional Convention of
1787, the closed debate concerning the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the
private meetings of the United States Senate prior to 1795. 17 In addition, some

10. Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow:
How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 272
(2003).
11. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
12. See, e.g., HAROLD CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW xiii-xiv (1954); Timothy B.
Dyk, News Gathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 959
(1992).
13. Dyk, supra note 12, at 959.
14. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (quoting JEREMY
BENTHAM, 1 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
15. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. CROSS, supra note 12, at 131-32.
17. See Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders
Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 51, 57-60 (2002).
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of the earliest United States legislation on record authorized executive branch
departments to withhold documents from the public at their discretion. 18
Delineating the extent of the public’s right of public access to information
is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court has never specifically ruled
there is a universal constitutional right of access. Although the Court has held
that such a right exists in particularized settings, its rulings regarding the right
of access have been limited to specific settings. 19
The Right of Access to Judicial Proceedings
Perhaps the most well articulated case dealing with the right of access to
information is the Supreme Court’s 1980 opinion in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, which held that the press and public have a First Amendment right of
access to trial proceedings. 20 Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, explained
that it was “not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal
trials . . . as a ‘right of access,’ or a ‘right to gather information.’” 21 Openness,
Justice Burger said, “may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press.” 22 He further claimed that access
was relevant to the First Amendment right of assembly, in part because
“[p]eople assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also
to listen, observe, and learn.” 23 Thus, when the Court ruled in Richmond
Newspapers that the public had a First Amendment right to attend trials, it
found that access was guaranteed specifically because access fostered First
Amendment values. 24
Given such broad pronouncements about the strength of the right of access,
the Court could have easily ruled that the right is fundamental and not merely
limited to judicial proceedings. However, the Court did not do so. 25 In fact, in
a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan articulated two important considerations
he believed the Court should use in determining whether access in particular
settings was warranted. 26 The first consideration was whether there was a
sufficient tradition of openness justifying access “to particular proceedings or

18. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing the Housekeeping Statue of 1789, 1 Stat.
68 (1789)).
19. See generally, Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse:” The First Amendment
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237 (1995).
20. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
21. Id. at 576 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 577.
23. Id. at 578.
24. Id. at 580.
25. Id. at 585-86.
26. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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information.” 27 The second consideration was whether there was a structural
value of openness—that is, whether access benefited the process at issue. 28
Using this two-part experience and logic rationale, the Court in subsequent
cases ruled that the right of public access extended to settings ancillary to the
trial itself, such as jury selection 29 and pretrial hearings. 30 In addition, lower
courts applying the Court’s Richmond Newspapers rationale found a right of
access to civil trials, administrative proceedings, and some fact-finding
hearings. 31 However, the Supreme Court has always stopped short of
concluding that the right of access is guaranteed in settings other than judicial
proceedings and those ancillary to them. 32
A Lack of Access in Non-Judicial Settings
In some contexts, the Court has specifically rejected the argument that the
First Amendment mandates a right of access to government activities and
information. 33 Rulings by the Supreme Court in three pre-Richmond
Newspapers cases are often cited to support the argument that the First
Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to such information. 34 In Pell
v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., journalists challenged a
California prison rule and a Federal Bureau of Prisons rule, respectively, which
prohibited media interviews with particular inmates of the media’s choosing. 35
In Houchins v. KQED the media challenged a local sheriff’s denial of access to
a portion of a jail. 36 In each case, the Court ruled that journalists did not have
a constitutional right of particularized access to such facilities beyond that
enjoyed by the general public. 37
Although the Court was dealing with media rights of access in these three
cases, the implication was that the public did not have such a right of access,
which is why the media also lacked the right. 38 In an earlier case, the Court
provided illustrative examples of settings where the media, and by implication

27. Id. This is sometimes referred to as “experience.” See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002).
28. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589, 598. This is sometimes referred to as “logic.”
See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695.
29. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513-14 (1984).
30. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
31. For a recent review of representative cases see Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695.
32. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585.
33. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 834-35 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974).
34. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849-50.
35. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
36. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3.
37. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
38. See, cases cited supra note 37.
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the public, have traditionally been excluded. 39 These examples include “grand
jury proceedings,” Supreme Court conferences, “meetings of other official
bodies gathered in executive session,” “meetings of private organizations,” and
“scenes of crime or disaster.” 40
The Supreme Court confirmed this limited view of access rights as recently
as 1999. 41 In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing
Corp., 42 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a California law
denying access to the addresses of arrestees when sought to sell a product or
service. 43 The Court noted that, because the case involved “nothing more than
a governmental denial of access to information in its possession,” the State
could have gone even further and decided “not to give out arrestee information
at all without violating the First Amendment.” 44 Even Justices Stevens and
Kennedy, who dissented because they felt the law was an improper violation of
commercial speech rights, acknowledged that denying access to arrestee
addresses would not have violated the First Amendment. 45
Judicial Hints of a Right of Access in Cases Addressing Other First
Amendment Rights
In general, the above cases illustrate that, outside of judicial proceedings,
the Court has been reluctant to compel the government to disclose information
on the theory that the public had a First Amendment right to access it.
However, in cases dealing with other First Amendment rights, the Court has, at
times, suggested that the right of access deserves constitutional protection. 46
For example, when addressing a Michigan obscenity law banning materials
tending to corrupt “the morals of youth,” the Court ruled that the law was
unconstitutionally overbroad, because it limited “the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.” 47 When reviewing a
Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials, the Court
declared it is “well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas.” 48 In the same case, the Court also declared,
“[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
at 44.
46.
47.
48.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972).
Id.
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Steven’s dissent. Id.
See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 384 (1957).
Id. at 383.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch.” 49
The same year, the Supreme Court upheld a portion of the FCC’s fairness
doctrine requiring broadcasters to provide a right of reply to a person
disparaged during the broadcast of a controversial issue. 50 In upholding the
regulation, the Court acknowledged that the public has a right to “suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences.” 51
The Court stressed that the First Amendment protects “an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.” 52
Recently, the right of access to information arose in United States v.
American Library Association. 53 In that case, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”), which
requires libraries to install internet filtering software on computers as a
condition to receiving certain federal grants. 54 Citing Stanley v. Georgia,
Justice Breyer indicated in his concurring opinion that the right to receive
information is protected by the First Amendment. 55 Therefore, he asserted that
the constitutionality of CIPA should have been tested with more exacting
scrutiny than the “rational basis” test used by the plurality, specifically because
it “restricts the public’s receipt of information.” 56 Similarly, Justice Souter,
with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in dissent, argued that strict scrutiny
should have been used to test the constitutionality of CIPA because of the
potential for internet filters to violate an adult patron’s First Amendment right
to access material of their choosing. 57
Cases Affirming a General First Amendment Right of Access
Although none of the cases in which the Court recognized a right to
information dealt with compelling the government to disclose government
information or activities, the cases did establish there is at least some
protection for the right of individuals to “receive information and ideas,” 58

49. Id. at 565.
50. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
51. Id. at 390.
52. Id.
53. 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 242-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
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particularly from each other. 59 This includes the right to receive corporate
political communications, 60 advertising, 61 labor union communications, 62
door-to-door solicitations, 63 and postal mail without having to take the
affirmative step of requesting it. 64 This right to information is based on the
premise that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock
of information from which members of the public may draw.” 65
In addition to the Supreme Court, some lower courts have recognized that
the First Amendment protects public access to information. 66 For example,
federal courts have ruled that statutes prohibiting exit interviews of voters near
polling places violated the media’s right to gather information. 67 Similarly,
courts have held that the First Amendment bars the police from unduly
interfering with the media’s newsgathering activities. 68 Courts have even ruled
that the government can be compelled to release records pursuant to citizens’
right of access to public records that is both rooted in the common law and
protected by the First Amendment. 69 In Richmond Newspapers the Supreme
Court also recognized that the right to attend trials was rooted in the common
law. 70
In all, one could argue that recognition of a public right of access has been
gaining ground in the United States, 71 and that the dissents of Stevens,
Brennan, and Powell in Houchins were validated by the Supreme Court in

59. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936) (discussing the right
of members of society to share information regarding their common interests).
60. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978).
61. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
62. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
63. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
64. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
65. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 783.
66. See, e.g., Daily Herald v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating a state law
that prohibited exit interviews within 300 feet of polling places); see also, CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681
F. Supp. 794, 806 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (invalidating 150 foot restriction on such interviews).
67. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 389; CBS, 681 F. Supp. at 806.
68. See, e.g., Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438-40 (9th Cir. 1995); Connell v.
Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 469-471 (D.N.H. 1990); see also, Barry P. McDonald, The
First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004) (providing an excellent review
of cases relevant to the right to gather information).
69. Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 195-96 (D.R.I. 1950) (ruling that the
state could not withhold information regarding tax cancellations and abatements).
70. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980).
71. For an interesting discussion of the growth of the “right to know” movement in the U.S.
see Pack, supra note 3, at 816-17.
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Richmond Newspapers. 72 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed this
perception when it ruled that the Bush administration’s practice of closing
deportation hearings violated the First Amendment. 73 The Sixth Circuit court
asserted that “it is clear that the Court has since moved away from its position
in Houchins and recognizes that there is a limited constitutional right to some
government information.” 74
However, until the Supreme Court specifically extends the rationale of
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny beyond judicially related contexts, the
extent of the First Amendment right of access to information will be contested.
The fact that the Court only addressed the issue squarely in Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny has left scholars to interpret the extent of the right
by looking to disparate decisions, rendered in an array of unrelated cases, that
provide little guidance on the precise extent of the right. 75 In fact, when it
comes to the question of requiring the government to take affirmative steps to
assure access to government activities or information, two former Supreme
Court Justices intimated that it is up to the political process (e.g., Congress)
rather than the Constitution, to determine what information the public can
obtain and the conditions under which it can be obtained. 76
LEGISLATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
The public’s right of access to government information has been addressed
in the political process. Congress and all state legislatures have passed open
meeting and/or open record laws that require varying degrees of government
openness and transparency. 77
At the federal level, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 78 has been
the most comprehensive legislation guaranteeing public access to government
records. 79 FOIA, enacted in 1966 (and amended various times over the
72. See Papandrea, supra note 3 at 41-44 for a discussion of these dissents that evidences
their consistency with the Richmond Newspapers decision.
73. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002).
74. Id.
75. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580-81.
76. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (Chief Justice Warren Burger asserted in
his majority opinion that determining whether a penal institution should be open was “clearly a
legislative task that the Constitution has left to the political processes.”); see also, Potter Stewart,
Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (Justice Stewart stated that “the public’s
interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the
protection is indirect. . . . The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its
resolution. Congress may provide the resolution . . . through carefully drawn legislation”).
77. For a general overview of access to records and open meeting laws, see KENT R.
MIDDLETON, ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 474-513 (1997).
78. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-306,
110 Stat. 3048 (2003).
79. Id.
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years), 80 permits “any person” to obtain information in the possession of a
federal agency regardless of the requester’s reasons for requesting the records
or what they intend to do with the information obtained. 81 Accordingly, FOIA
provides a presumption of access. 82 If a federal agency feels that records in its
possession are not subject to disclosure, the burden is on the government to
show that the information should not be divulged. 83
FOIA provides nine exemptions that permit a federal agency to withhold
information under specific circumstances. 84
Information exempt from
disclosure includes (1) information classified in the interest of protecting
“national defense or foreign policy,” (2) information pertaining to an agency’s
personnel rules and practices, (3) information protected from disclosure
pursuant to another statute, (4) privileged or confidential “trade secrets and
commercial and financial information,” (5) information not available by law to
a party “other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” (6) personnel,
medical, and similar files that would constitute an invasion of personal privacy
if disclosed, (7) records maintained for law enforcement reasons, (8)
information pertaining to financial institution supervision or regulation, and (9)
geological and geophysical information pertaining to wells. 85
FOIA’s presumption of public access to government records, subject only
to these enumerated exemptions, has generated significant litigation in which
courts have had to interpret whether the exemption(s) being relied on by the
government justified denial of access. 86 Executive branch secrecy during the
War on Terrorism has stimulated some of this litigation. 87
GOVERNMENT SECRECY AND INFORMATION ACCESS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM
In Houchins, the Supreme Court suggested that the First Amendment does
not require that the government provide access to its facilities, activities, and
records. 88 However, that suggestion has never been the uniform position of all
Justices. In cases decided both before and after Houchins, the Supreme Court

80. For a brief review of significant amendments, see DWIGHT L. TEETER ET AL., LAW OF
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 437-40
(1989).
81. § 552(a)(3); see also Papandrea, supra note 3, at 50.
82. § 552(a)(3).
83. § 552(a)(4)(B).
84. § 552(b).
85. § 552(b).
86. For recent cases see The Department of Justice, Freedom of Information Case List, May
2002, www.usdoj.gov/04foia/cl-tofc.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
87. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir
2003); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2003).
88. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 4 (1978).
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and lower courts recognized at least some degree of constitutional protection of
the public’s access rights. 89 Congress has also opened the doors to government
through legislation such as FOIA and the Sunshine Act, 90 which require access
to government records and meetings, respectively. Most state legislatures have
passed similar legislation creating a presumption of openness to government
records and meetings. 91
However, the War on Terrorism presents new challenges to increased
openness and has stimulated debate about the extent of the right of the public
to receive information about government activities related to the war. Wars
tend to heighten the tension between citizens’ desire for information about the
government’s wartime activities and the government’s desire to control access
in order to protect national security.
Assuming arguendo that the First Amendment does protect a “right of
access” to information, like other First Amendment rights, the right is not
absolute. It can be outweighed by more salient countervailing government
interests. National security is one significant and broad government interest
that has been used extensively by the Bush administration during the War on
Terrorism to deny the public access to information concerning its wartime
activities. 92
Judicial confusion regarding the right of access to information reflected in
the above cases, coupled with the reluctance of courts to compel disclosure of
information that allegedly could harm national security, has been apparent
during the War on Terrorism. Below, I will discuss a few poignant examples
that have generated the most attention in the last few years.
FOIA during the War on Terrorism
The strain between public FOIA rights and government initiatives taken in
the War on Terrorism has been the subject of wide discussion. 93 One
overarching issue has been the Bush administration’s apparent proclivity to
hide its activities from public view. 94
For example, in October 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft directed
agencies to exercise a more restrictive interpretation of FOIA requests than that

89. See e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); Providence
Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 196 (D.R.I. 1950).
90. See MIDDLETON ET AL., supra note 77, at 513 (discussing the Sunshine Act of 1976,
which requires federal agencies to conduct open meetings).
91. Id.
92. Papandrea, supra note 3, at 35.
93. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3, at 1605; McDermott, supra note 3, at 671; O’Reilly,
supra note 3, at 809; Steinzor, supra note 3, at 642-43; Wells, supra note 3, at 451-52.
94. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 35.
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taken during the Clinton administration. 95 Whereas the Clinton administration
interpreted FOIA to facilitate public access to documents, the Bush
administration’s approach arguably impedes access by pledging Department of
Justice support of non-disclosure decisions (provided there is a “sound legal
basis” for them) and encouraging use of FOIA exemptions. 96
Shortly after the Attorney General’s October 2001 directive, Andrew Card,
the President’s Chief of Staff, directed federal agencies to interpret FOIA
exemptions carefully and to withhold not only classified documents, but also
sensitive information even if it was unclassified and not specifically exempted
under FOIA. 97 He also directed agencies to review their records to insure that
information in their control was properly classified. 98
The President also has acted to reduce the amount of government
information available to the public. 99 As referenced above, FOIA exempts
from disclosure information classified pursuant to an Executive Order for the
preservation of national security. 100 On March 25, 2003, President Bush
increased the scope of material subject to this exemption by issuing Executive
Order 13,292. 101 The order encourages the classification of information in the
hands of federal agencies and the reclassification of information that had
previously been released. 102
Congress has supported the executive branch’s efforts toward secrecy. For
example, the Homeland Security Act, 103 passed at the President’s urging,
specifically directs the President to “safeguard homeland security information
that is sensitive but unclassified.” 104 Congress also passed the Critical
Information Infrastructure Act (“CIIA”). 105 The CIIA encourages private
sector entities (e.g., corporations) to share information with the government by
providing them with immunity from civil liability in return for submitting

95. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft for Heads of all Federal
Departments and Agencies (October 12, 2001) available at www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
96. Id.
97. Memorandum from Andrew Card Jr., assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, for
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (March 19, 2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/
oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2006).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Exec Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2005).
101. Exec Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
102. Id.
103. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
104. 6 U.S.C. § 482(a)(1)(B) (2005).
105. The CIIA is part of the Homeland Security Act. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
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critical infrastructure information to the government. 106 Critical infrastructure
information is “information not customarily in the public domain and related to
the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems.” 107
An important provision of the Act provides that critical infrastructure
information submitted to the government “shall be exempt from disclosure”
under FOIA, 108 and “shall not . . . be used or disclosed by any officer or
employee of the United States.” 109 The Department of Justice has taken the
position that information voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland
Security pursuant to the CIIA is exempt from disclosure under section
552(b)(3) of FOIA. 110
In addition to congressional support for the President’s restrictive FOIA
approach, there has been significant judicial support as well. 111 The first major
case in which FOIA was used in an attempt to force the executive branch to
disclose information during the war on terrorism was Center for National
Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice. 112 The case arose when several
public interest groups sought to compel the government to release information
regarding the number of people detained in the War on Terrorism, their
identities, the identities of their lawyers, the reasons for detainment, and where
detainees were being held. 113 The Department of Justice argued that FOIA
exemptions 7(A), (C), and (F) justified withholding the information. 114
Despite agreeing that FOIA did not exempt the bulk of the material sought, the
district court specifically rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they were
entitled to the information pursuant to the First Amendment and common law
right of access to public records. 115
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order
rejecting the government’s claim that the material was exempt. 116 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the current threat of terrorism warranted the
exercise of judicial deference to the judgment of the executive branch in light

106. Public Citizen, FOIA and Homeland Security Issues, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/
free_info/foic_lr/otherstatues/index.cfm.
107. 6 U.S.C. § 131(3)
108. § 133(a)(1)(A).
109. § 133(a)(1)(D).
110. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy, Homeland Security Law
Contains New Exemption 3 Statute, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2003foiapost4.htm.
111. See generally Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002).
112. Id. at 94.
113. Id. at 97.
114. Id. at 100. The exemptions are codified at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(A), (C) & (F) (2005).
115. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12.
116. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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of national security implications. 117 Requiring little proof of actual national
security dangers of disclosure, the appellate court stated that the government’s
counterterrorism officials were in the best position to make this predictive
judgment. 118
Like the district court, the circuit court also rejected the argument that the
First Amendment required disclosure. 119 The court applied a very narrow
reading of the right of access, specifically stating that “[t]he narrow First
Amendment right of access to information recognized in Richmond
Newspapers does not extend to non-judicial documents that are not part of a
criminal trial.” 120 Therefore, according to the court, the First Amendment was
not even “implicated by the executive’s refusal to disclose the identities of the
detainees and information concerning their detention.” 121
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel lamented that “the court’s uncritical
deference to the government’s vague, poorly explained arguments for
withholding broad categories of information about the detainees, as well as its
willingness to fill in the factual and logical gaps in the government’s case,
eviscerates both FOIA itself and the principles of openness in government that
FOIA embodies.” 122 Hinting at greater sensitivity for the plaintiff’s First
Amendment argument than that exhibited by the majority, Judge Tatel stated
that:
[a]lthough this court overlooks it, there is another compelling interest at stake
in this case: the public’s interest in knowing whether the government, in
responding to the attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of the hundreds
of persons whom it has detained in connection with its terrorism
investigation . . . . Just as the government has a compelling interest in ensuring
citizens’ safety, so do citizens have a compelling interest in ensuring that their
government does not, in discharging its duties, abuse one of its most awesome
powers, the power to arrest and jail. 123

Thus, like numerous prior right of access cases, the circuit court’s opinion
was not unanimous. 124 The judges disagreed on the extent to which the public
had a right to know what its government was doing. 125
Another important post-9/11 FOIA case implicating public access rights
dealt with the government’s refusal to release information regarding its

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 934.
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies., 331 F.3d at 935.
Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id. at 937-38 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id.
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surveillance activities enhanced by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. 126 In American
Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Justice, 127 the ACLU and other
civil liberties groups sought, in part, “records containing aggregate statistical
information revealing how often DOJ had used the Act’s new surveillance and
search provisions: roving surveillance under section 206; pen registers/trap and
trace devices under section 214; demands for production of tangible things
under section 215; and sneak and peek warrants under section 213.” 128 The
Justice Department argued that the information was exempt from disclosure
primarily pursuant to FOIA’s national security exemption because the
information could aid terrorists and harm national security. 129
At least acknowledging a public right of access, the district court judge
noted that “it must be recognized that FOIA represents a carefully considered
balance between the right of the public to know what their government is up to
and the often compelling interest that the government maintains in keeping
certain information private, whether to protect particular individuals or the
national interest as a whole.” 130 However, relying on affidavits from
government officials, the judge granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment, stressing that although the “plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of
disclosure are not without force, they are ultimately insufficient to overcome
the agency’s expert judgment that withholding the disputed information is
authorized . . . because it is reasonably connected to the protection of national
security.” 131
In short, in two of the most important post-9/11 FOIA challenges to
government non-disclosure, federal courts granted the executive branch
significant latitude to determine for itself what information should be made
public.
Deportation Hearings and Military Trials During the War on Terrorism
In addition to FOIA matters, the Bush administration’s practice of
controlling the disclosure of information has been reflected in the
administration’s handling of deportation hearings and its authorization to
establish military tribunals to try alleged foreign terrorists captured by the
United States. Although there are a host of legal issues implicated by these
initiatives, the fact that the executive branch has authorized the closure of each
of these types of proceedings is the most relevant issue.

126.
2003).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 21. The exemption is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
Id. at 30.
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Deportation Hearings. On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy instructed immigration judges to close deportation hearings
designated as “special interest” proceedings. 132 The media quickly challenged
the practice of conducting these hearings in secrecy. 133 Unfortunately, the two
federal appellate courts that heard the challenges to the practice disagreed
about whether the hearings could be closed. 134
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that closing deportation hearings violated the First Amendment rights of the
press and public. 135 In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that closure was justified, based on the
government’s assertion that national security mandated closure. 136
Both courts relied upon the Supreme Court’s “experience and logic”
rationale elaborated in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. 137 However,
whereas the Sixth Circuit felt there was a tradition of open deportation
hearings, the Third Circuit disagreed, citing examples of instances when
hearings may not be conducted in places open to the public (e.g., private
homes or prisons). 138 In addition, the Sixth Circuit felt that openness enhanced
the structural value of the process by ensuring that the hearings were
conducted properly and informed the public. 139 The Third Circuit court,
however, felt that the “flip side” had to be considered: the potential negative
effects of openness on national security. 140 Ultimately, a divided Third Circuit
decided that the risk to national security outweighed the benefits that openness
might provide. 141
Military Tribunals. Unlike post-9/11 deportation hearings, military trials
of alleged terrorists have been authorized by the President, but not yet

132. See North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3rd Cir. 2002)
(discussing Judge Creppy’s directive). Special interest proceedings include those involving
persons who “might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist
activities against the United States.” Id. at 202 (citing a declaration of Dale L. Watson, Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence).
133. Id. at 203-04.
134. Id. at 221; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002).
135. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
136. 308 F.3d at 221.
137. Id. at 204-05; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684-85.
138. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701, with North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d
at 212.
139. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703-05 (identifying several values served by public
access to immigration hearings, including: serving a check on the executive branch, ensuring that
the government did its job properly, serving as a catharsis for the public, enhancing a perception
of fairness, and providing information about public affairs).
140. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.
141. Id.
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conducted. 142 Like deportation hearings, the executive branch has asserted the
authority to close them in the interest of national security. 143 President Bush
issued the order authorizing military tribunals on November 13, 2001. 144 The
order empowered the Department of Defense to issue rules and regulations that
would govern the military proceedings. 145 Shortly thereafter, the Department
of Defense issued a military order setting forth parameters for the military
commission proceedings. 146 Section 6B(3) of the Department of Defense
Order provides that proceedings can be closed to protect classified or
classifiable information, information protected from disclosure by rule or law,
the safety of trial participants, intelligence and law enforcement sources, and
national security interests. 147
Although military trials of alleged terrorists have not yet been conducted,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently cleared the way for the trials to
proceed. 148 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 149 the D.C. Circuit ruled that alleged al
Qaeda terrorists designated by the Pentagon as “enemy combatants” are not
prisoners of war covered by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and can be tried
before the President’s military commissions. 150 The court also ruled that
Congress properly authorized use of the tribunals, 151 and found that Supreme
Court precedent upheld the use of such tribunals during World War II. 152
One aspect of those World War II military trials the Hamdan court did not
reference is the fact that they were closed proceedings. 153 However, they
occurred long before the Supreme Court’s Richmond Newspapers decision. 154
The application of the Richmond Newspapers experience and logic rationale by
the Sixth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal when assessing the First
Amendment right of access to “special interest” deportation hearings suggest it
142. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
143. Id. at 57,835.
144. Id. at 57,833.
145. Id at 57,834.
146. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1 (March 21, 2002), available at
www.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dod032102milcomord1.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001); see also, 10 U.S.C § 821 and § 836, (cited as authority in the President’s Military Order).
152. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1942).
153. For a brief description of the closed proceedings of the Ex parte Quirin defendants, see
Papandrea, supra note 3, at 76-78.
154. Compare In re Yamashita, 317 U.S. at 1 (decided in 1946) and Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. at 1 (decided in 1942), with Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(decided in 1980).
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is relevant to proceedings implemented during the War on Terrorism. 155 The
Richmond Newspapers rationale also has been found applicable to military
proceedings. 156 Since 1985, the Court of Military Appeals has maintained a
presumption that military court martial proceedings must be open. 157 The fact
that the President drew on the Code of Military Justice when authorizing the
use of military tribunals in the War on Terrorism arguably assumes the
applicability of this presumption of openness. 158 However, the President also
asserted the authority to close these tribunals. 159
Because the President’s military tribunals, like those conducted during and
in the aftermath of World War II, are subject to closure by the executive
branch, closure of one or more of the tribunals in the interest of national
security could trigger a debate between government secrecy and public access
rights that is unique to wartime (the military trials of enemy combatants) and
has never been addressed by the Supreme Court. 160 In addition, because
military tribunals are forums that are very similar to civilian trials, which the
Supreme Court has indicated must be open, their closure, like FOIA disputes
and closed deportation hearings, would represent an important front in the
tension between openness and government secrecy in the War on Terrorism. 161
Some Additional Examples of Government Suppression of Information
The Bush administration’s efforts to control disclosure of information in
FOIA matters, deportation hearings, and military trials of terrorists are
examples of initiatives implemented during the War on Terrorism that
arguably affect the public’s access to information. Although too numerous to
detail here, it is worthwhile to reference a few additional initiatives aimed at
controlling public access and government transparency. 162

155. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
156. United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1985).
157. Id. at 435.
158. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). The President cited 10 U.S.C. 821 and
10 U.S.C. 836 (Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)).
159. Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835 (Nov. 13, 2001).
160. See generally Paul Haridakis, The War on Terrorism: Military Trials and the First
Amendment, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317 (2004) (discussing military trials and a right of access).
161. Id.
162. For a more comprehensive list and examination of examples in which the executive
branch has withheld information from the public and Congress, see Minority Staff Special
Investigations Division, United States House of Representatives Committee on Government
Reform, Secrecy in the Bush Administration, (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman), available at
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/secrecy_report/index.asp (hereinafter Minority Staff
Investigations Division).
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Congressional Action. Although the Bush administration has received
substantial criticism for dissuading disclosure of information, the
administration often has been acting pursuant to the authority granted to it by
Congress. 163 Section 215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the CIIA (included
as part of the Homeland Security Act) are two particularly noteworthy tools
Congress has given the executive branch that specifically mandate
nondisclosure of government activity. 164
Section 215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act165 enhanced and expanded the
ability of the government to obtain records regarding individuals’ educational,
library, banking, and medical records from institutions that retain them. 166
Section 215 cultivates government secrecy, in effect, by imposing a statutory
gag rule on the institutions from which such records are obtained. 167
Specifically, if records are sought or obtained by the FBI, the institutions from
which the records are sought or obtained are prohibited from disclosing the
FBI’s inquiry. 168
The CIIA imposes a similar de facto gag rule. 169 As referenced above, the
CIIA was passed as part of the Homeland Security Act. 170 It encourages
private entities to turn critical infrastructure information over to the
Department of Homeland Security. 171 The Act gags government employees by
providing that those who disclose critical infrastructure information provided
by corporations “shall be fined under title 18 of the United States Code,
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, and shall be removed from office or
employment.” 172
Executive Branch Action. Although Congress has, to some extent,
supported governmental suppression of information during the War on
terrorism, the exercise of suppression has most often been carried out by the

163. See 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2005); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2004).
164. 6 U.S.C. § 133; 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
165. 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
166. For comprehensive discussions of Section 215, which expanded the entities from which
the FBI could obtain records and lessened the burden for obtaining an order for records under the
Foreign Surveillance Act, see Katherine K. Coolidge, “Baseless Hysteria:” The Controversy
Between the Department of Justice and the American Library Association over the USA
PATRIOT Act, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 7 (2005); Anne Klinefelter, The Role of Librarians in Challenges
to the USA PATRIOT Act, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 219 (2004); Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the
Lady from Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic Surveillance at the Library, 96 LAW LIBR.
J. 449 (2004); Michael J. O’Donnell, Reading for Terrorism: Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act and the Constitutional Right to Information Privacy, 31 J. LEGIS. 45 (2004).
167. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d).
168. Id.
169. See 6 U.S.C. § 133(f).
170. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
171. 6 U.S.C. § 133.
172. 6 U.S.C. § 133(f).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY

23

executive branch. 173 In addition to closing deportation hearings, authorizing
closed military tribunals, and broadly interpreting FOIA exemptions, the Bush
administration has taken great pains to cloak other activities in secrecy. 174
A significant mechanism has been an expansive interpretation and use of
legal privileges, including executive privilege. 175 For example, when Congress
requested information regarding activities of Vice President Cheney’s energy
task force, which he impaneled in his capacity as the President’s head of
national energy policy, the executive branch claimed the information sought
was privileged from disclosure. 176 When records of former President Ronald
Reagan were due to be released and made available to the public pursuant to
the Presidential Records Act of 1978, 177 President Bush invoked executive
privilege to restrict disclosure of presidential records to which the public would
otherwise have access. 178 Specifically, he issued Executive Order 13,233 179 to
eliminate a presumption of disclosure and expand the scope of the records that
could be delayed from disclosure. 180 The Executive Order also extended such
protection to the Vice President. 181
In July 2005, the President nominated John Roberts, one of the circuit
court judges who ruled in Hamdan that the President’s military trials could
proceed, to fill the vacancy on the United States Supreme Court created when
Sandra Day O’Connor resigned. 182 When Congress asked the White House to
turn over documents regarding Justice Robert’s advice during his tenure in the
administrations of former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush,
the administration invoked the attorney-client and attorney work product
privileges to withhold documents from disclosure. 183 The administration took
a similar approach in the face of congressional requests for documents
pertaining to the work product of recently appointed UN Ambassador, John
Bolton. 184

173. McDermott, supra note 3, at 673-79.
174. Id. at 679-82.
175. Id. at 681-82.
176. For a discussion of the dispute between the White House and Congress, see McDermott,
supra note 3, at 679-81 and Steinzor, supra note 3, at 660.
177. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.).
178. 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 56,025-26.
181. For more detailed reviews of the Executive Order see McDermott, supra note 3, at 68183 and Steinzor, supra note 3, at 661.
182. See Dan Balz & Charles Lane, A Move to the Right, An Eye to Confirmation, WASH.
POST, July 20, 2005, at A1.
183. See Amy Goldstein et al., Roberts Resisted Women’s Rights: 1982-1986 Memos Detail
Skepticism, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2005, at A4.
184. See Douglas Jehl & Carl Hulse, McCain Urging Accord on Bolton and Secret
Documents, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2005, at A3.
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The executive branch has been particularly fervent in concealing
information pertaining to individuals detained during the War on Terrorism. 185
In addition to providing that military trials of detainees could be closed, the
Pentagon has been secretive about the tribunals and potential defendants. 186
The executive branch zealously fought the release of information about
detainees in the face of a FOIA request. 187 In addition, it allegedly has
withheld information from Congress, restricted press access to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, required journalists visiting the prison to sign contracts agreeing
not to speak to detainees, and ordered secret detentions of prisoners captured
during the war in Iraq. 188
Judicial Branch. It is at least worth mentioning that the judicial branch
bears some responsibility for the government’s non-disclosure of information
to the public. 189 Judicial branch acquiescence to government secrecy has come
in the form of opinions in which courts exercised significant deference to
executive branch actions. 190 Dissents penned in these cases indicate that even
some jurists are troubled by the uncritical acceptance of government reasons
for withholding information from the public. When the media appealed the
Third Circuit’s decision in North Jersey, the United States Supreme Court
declined to hear the appeal, leaving a significant split between the circuits
regarding whether the First Amendment rights of access apply in deportation
hearings. 191
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AND SECRECY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
The above discussion was intended to provide some illustrative recent
examples of the government’s efforts to withhold disclosure of certain
activities from the public. Most Americans undoubtedly recognize such
practices are, at times, in the public interest. 192 However, public access to
information regarding the activities of the government, which, ostensibly, are
exercised on behalf of the people, is fundamental to the U.S. democratic
principle of self-governance. 193 As stated earlier, the people may not rule in a

185. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 52-53.
186. Id. at 53.
187. Id. at 64-66.
188. See, e.g., Minority Staff Investigations Division, supra note 162, at 62-63.
189. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); North
Jersey Media Group v. Aschroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002).
190. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 918; North Jersey Media Group, 308
F.3d at 198.
191. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
192. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 69; McDermott supra note 3 at 671 (detailing how public
access to information could be used by terrorists and threaten national security).
193. Papandrea, supra note 3, at 74.
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practical sense, but “they do judge those who do.” 194 Accordingly,
government efforts at controlling public access, such as those exercised by the
government during the War on Terrorism must be scrutinized closely, as such
secrecy limits the information in the public domain, which is necessary for
maintaining the integrity and accountability of government bodies.
Although it strains credulity to argue that citizen consent and selfgovernance can be achieved if information necessary to give consent and
engage in self-governance is withheld, the extent to which the Constitution
protects the public’s access rights is still being contested. 195 In several cases,
the Supreme Court has noted the importance of access to our democracy, and
several individual justices have supported the argument that access is
constitutionally protected. 196 What has escaped resolution and consensus,
though, is the extent of that protection. 197
There is little dispute that both Congress and the executive branch have
taken actions during the War on Terrorism that has limited the amount of
information available to the public about the federal government’s wartime
activities. However, it is difficult to assess whether those actions have violated
the public’s First Amendment right of access, because prior case law suggests
that the extent of a right of access is contingent on the setting and type of
information involved. 198 Generally, the right of access has been afforded the
most protection in judicial settings where the Supreme Court has indicated that
the right to attend trials is protected. 199 Courts also have afforded significant
protection for a right of access in cases involving willing speakers and willing
recipients, and in cases involving challenges to government interference with
communication between private entities and citizens. 200 But, the right of

194. Hamilton & Kohnen, supra note 10, at 272.
195. See e.g., Kentucky Press Ass’n, Inc. v. Kentucky, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 865 (E.D.Ky.
2005) (no right of access to juvenile judicial proceedings); Youngstown Pub. Co. v. McKelvey,
2005 WL 1153996, at *7 (N.D. Oh. 2005) (no constitutional protection for a privileged right of
access); United States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 250-51 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding no First
Amendment right of access existed with respect to sentencing letters).
196. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). Chief Justice Burger
delivered the majority opinion, but Justices Stevens and Brennan each filed concurring opinions
endorsing the view that the First Amendment protects a right of access to information. Id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
197. See generally F.B.I. v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982) (noting that the right of
access to information under the FOIA depends on the type of information sought).
198. Id.
199. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580.
200. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (noting that the
citizen is entitled to seek out or reject certain ideas or influences without government interference
or control).
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access has been deemed to be less salient, if implicated at all, when individuals
or entities have tried to compel government actors to disclose information in
In the latter context, the courts seem to have
their possession. 201
acknowledged that the government should not operate in secrecy outside the
eyes and ears of the people. 202 However, the courts have been unwilling to
interpret the First Amendment in a manner that arms individual citizens with
the ability to demand government disclosure without government consent. 203
Accordingly, one could argue that recent government initiatives, discussed
previously, which have curtailed the accessibility of information have not
violated citizen access rights. However, ongoing judicial disharmony
regarding the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right of access
in different contexts is unsettling in a wartime atmosphere in which the
government’s compelling interest in preventing terrorism must be balanced
against an equally compelling interest of the public for information necessary
to find the proper balance between protecting public security and maintaining
the integrity and accountability of government bodies.
Executive Branch Wartime Tribunals
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Richmond
Newspapers, there has been a quarter of a century of case law confirming that
the public has a First Amendment right of access to a variety of criminal, civil,
and administrative judicial proceedings. 204 But it is not clear whether that right
extends to wartime tribunals established by the executive branch. The Court
has never addressed whether the public has a First Amendment right of access
to the military trials of enemy combatants captured during a war.
If the Court were called upon to review the closure of such a proceeding, it
could interpret its post-World War II precedent in Richmond Newspapers to
mean that there is a First Amendment right of access mandating the
presumption of open military trials. This result would be most acceptable to
staunch advocates of government transparency. It also would be consistent
with the view expressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it ruled

201. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
202. Id. at 925.
203. Id. at 937.
204. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (statute prohibiting witness from forever
disclosing testimony relating to alleged government misconduct before grand jury violates the
First Amendment); Press-Enterprise Co., v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County,
478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies
to preliminary hearings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 696 (6th Cir 2002)
(drawing sharp lines between administrative and judicial proceedings would allow the legislature
to artfully craft information out of the public eye); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
1059, 1070 (3rd Cir. 1984) stating that the (First Amendment embraces a right of access to civil
trials as well as criminal trials).
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that the public and press had a First Amendment right of access to “special
interest” deportation hearings convened during the War on Terrorism. 205
However, even if the Court ruled that there is a First Amendment right of
access, the Court could rule that the right of access is outweighed by the
government’s national security interests. This decision would be consistent
with recent federal court decisions permitting the executive branch to close
special interest deportation hearings 206 and withhold records requested under
the FOIA. 207 It also would be consistent with a long history of judicial
deference to the executive branch during wartime, even when significant
individual liberties were adversely affected. 208
On the other hand, the Court could avoid the need to balance national
security and citizen access rights by ruling that there is no First Amendment
right of public access to military trial proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers,
the Court ruled that a public right of access to criminal trials attached because
they had always been open in the United States. 209 Because prior military
trials have been closed, such as those conducted during and immediately after
World War II (the last time military trials of enemy combatants were
conducted), the Court could find that there is an insufficient history of
openness to warrant First Amendment access (experience). In addition, it
could rule that wartime military trials of enemy combatants are so unique that
openness does not enhance the process or administration of justice in such
proceedings (logic). The Hamdan court hinted at this uniqueness when it
distinguished such military commissions from a military court martial. 210
Thus, even in the case of judicial settings, where the right of access has
been most robust, there are significant open questions as to the extent of access
rights to particularized wartime judicial proceedings.
Compelling the Government to Divulge Records
Although proponents of disclosure may not be content with the decisions
in Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, and
American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Justice, neither decision
is inconsistent with prior precedent regarding access to government-controlled

205. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
206. North Jersey Media Group v. Aschroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220 (3rd Cir. 2002).
207. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir 2003); Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003).
208. For a representative review of several cases in which courts exercised deference to the
political branches during wars and other hostilities, including the current War on Terrorism, see
Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Mathew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial
Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 801-02 (2004); see also, WILLIAM
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218 (1998).
209. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
210. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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information. 211 FOIA established enumerated exemptions to disclosure of
government documents. 212 The courts in these recent cases simply found that
the information was not subject to disclosure and that the government’s
reliance on the relevant exemptions was appropriate. 213
As a practical matter, the First Amendment right of access has been
interpreted most narrowly in cases in which access to government facilities or
documents was sought. 214 In Center for National Security Studies, the D.C
Circuit simply reaffirmed the view that the First Amendment does not
“mandate[] a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.” 215 In fact, when the Supreme
Court recently addressed the constitutional right of access to information
outside of a judicial context, it relied on Houchins, rather than Richmond
Newspapers. 216 The Bush administration’s extensive use of Executive Orders
and legal privileges to withhold information from the public represents zealous
reliance on this restrictive view of public access rights.
The Flow of Information between Citizens
Government interference with the flow of information between citizens is
another troubling breach of the right to receive information. There is a long
line of precedent recognizing the right of citizens to receive information from
each other. 217 However, it does not appear that recent government efforts to
protect information from disclosure have included pervasive attempts to
interfere with the flow of information between citizens. Then again, Section
215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the CIIA come close. Section 215 of the
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act forbids private entities or individuals from disclosing
government inquiries into their patrons’ records. 218 Although there is little
evidence of widespread use of Section 215, the secrecy it mandates is designed
to limit disclosure of such evidence. 219 Because the House of Representatives
211. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 936; Am. Civil Liberties Union, 265 F. Supp. 2d
at 26-27.
212. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000).
213. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 937; Am. Civil Liberties Union, 265 F. Supp. 2d
at 34-35.
214. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (limiting access of journalists to prisons);
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 936 (limiting government access to information regarding
suspected terrorist detainees).
215. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 934 (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15
(1978)).
216. See Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999).
For a brief discussion, see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
218. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1861).
219. See id.
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and the Senate recently voted to renew Section 215, 220 the danger of
government enforcement of private entity suppression of information remains.
The threat of criminal prosecution for release of critical infrastructure
information by government employees under the CIIA also poses an ongoing
effort to gag those who might disclose information in the government’s
possession.
CONCLUSION
In short, those who might support the exercise of government secrecy
during the War on Terrorism have a significant body of jurisprudence on
which to draw that suggests that the First Amendment does not protect the
right to compel government disclosure of its activities. However, as the
representative cases and literature reviewed here indicate, that position has
never been universally accepted among scholars or jurists.
The lack of agreement among jurists has been highlighted in recent cases
addressing access rights during the War on Terrorism. For example, the Sixth
Circuit ruling in Detroit Free Press that conducting closed deportation
hearings violated the First Amendment was unanimous, three to zero. 221 The
Third Circuit’s North Jersey ruling that closing the hearings did not violate the
First Amendment was split, two to one. 222 In addition, both of the federal
district court judges whose decisions were appealed in Detroit Free Press and
North Jersey ruled that the practice of closing these deportation hearings
violated the First Amendment. 223 Although the D.C. Circuit ruled in Center
for National Security Studies that the FOIA did not require the government to
release information on alleged terrorist detainees, that decision also was split,
two to one. 224 Thus, when one considers the views expressed by individual
judges in these important post-9/11 right of access cases, it is clear that the
majority of them were troubled by the government’s secrecy efforts. 225
Given the lack of agreement among jurists, it is disingenuous to argue that
the Constitution does not protect an overarching right of public access to
government-controlled information simply because the Supreme Court has not
given copious attention to it. The interpretation of constitutional rights is not
220. USA PATRIOT Improvement Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong.
(2005).
221. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682, 711 (6th Cir. 2002).
222. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220 (3rd Cir. 2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
223. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Mich. 2002); North Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002).
224. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir 2003). Judge
D. Tatel was the lone dissenter. Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
225. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 951-52; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683;
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
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static. Many of the First Amendment rights we now have were not specifically
articulated by the Supreme Court until the 20th century—often times in cases in
which the Court rejected its own precedent. 226 For example, in 1915 the Court
ruled that the First Amendment did not protect movies. 227 That decision was
overruled in 1952. 228 There was a time when the Court ruled that commercial
speech was not protected. 229 That changed in the mid 1970s. 230 There was a
time when any criticism of the government considered to be anarchist was not
protected. 231 That changed in 1969. 232 There was a time when words tending
to affront a listener were considered to be unprotected “fighting words.” 233
That changed in the early 1970s. 234
In these and a myriad of other cases in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the First Amendment to protect what previously had been
considered unprotected expression, the Court was not dissuaded by the
Constitution’s lack of explicitness, or its own contradictory precedent. 235 As
Justice Burger noted in Richmond Newspapers, when addressing the argument
that the Constitution does not spell out a right to attend trials,
[C]ertain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees. For
example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed
innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the
Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important but unarticulated rights
have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with
explicit guarantees. 236

226. See infra notes 228, 230, and 232 and accompanying text.
227. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915).
228. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
229. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
230. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
231. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
232. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
233. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
234. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); see also, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 523-25 (1972). Together, these cases evidenced the Court’s departure from its previous
“fighting words” doctrine that abusive words not spoken in a face-to-face confrontation could be
considered fighting words.
235. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980) (noting that the Court
has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees of
the Constitution); supra notes 228, 230, and 232 and accompanying text.
236. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579-80.
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Accordingly, the Court ruled that the First Amendment guaranteed public
access to trial processes, even though just one year earlier the Court questioned
whether such access was protected. 237
Unfortunately, the Court has not specifically extended its rationale in
Richmond Newspapers to support an overarching First Amendment right of
access in settings other than judicial proceedings or those ancillary to them.
Given the failure of the Court to resolve the extent of the right of access
conclusively, it has been left largely to the political process (e.g., the executive
and legislative branches) to define what the government must disclose to the
public. 238 In the best of times this is perilous, because it gives government
bodies that are accountable to the public the power to determine what
information the public will have with which to hold them accountable. In the
worst of times, such as times of war, when government actors have never been
at their best in defending civil liberties, it is a dire risk to finding the proper
balance between individual liberty and government abuse that can come from
secrecy.
Paul Rosenzweig of the Heritage Foundation recently stressed that
achieving both security and liberty as the nation combats terrorism
is not a zero-sum game . . . . So long as we keep a vigilant eye on police
authority, so long as the federal courts remain open, and so long as the debate
about governmental conduct is a vibrant part of the American dialogue, the
risk of excessive encroachment on our fundamental liberties is remote. The
only real danger lies in silence and leaving policies unexamined. 239

It seems clear that achieving this necessary level of scrutiny is jeopardized if
the information needed to engage in such civic participation is not available to
United States citizens.
Accordingly, it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit its restrictive view
of citizen access rights outside of judicial settings that has been used to support
government secrecy. The Court’s silence on this issue since September 11,
2001, is deafening. Its careful deliberation is imperative. How the Court
assists the United States in resolving the balance between public access rights
and government secrecy in the War on Terrorism will have much to say about
the extent to which we value First Amendment rights at the beginning of the
21st century and how much we value self-governance by and self determination
of “the people.”

237. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979).
238. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (stating that the determination of
whether the government should grant the public access to certain records is “clearly a legislative
task which the Constitution has left to the political process”).
239. Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663,
723 (2004).
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Therefore, the cry to the Court during the war on terrorism is urgent: Tear
down the walls of government secrecy once and for all.

